INTRODUCTION
It has been several years since the Annual Survey of Virginia Law published a comprehensive Health Care Law update.' In that time, health care reform has taken center stage on the national level with the implementation of the Affordable Care Act and related federal legislation. Here in the Commonwealth, we have seen incremental change in the health care law landscape, both in case decisions from the Supreme Court of Virginia impacting medical malpractice jurisprudence, and in a host of reform measures and legislative changes from the General Assembly. It is beyond the scope of this article to detail every change in this complex and fast-changing area of law, but noteworthy developments are highlighted here in an effort to inform the health law practitioner.
I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
Over the last five years, the Supreme Court of Virginia has weighed in on several important health care issues in the Com-monwealth. The Virginia Medical Malpractice Act 2 continues to define the operation of medical negligence cases, and in Simpson v. Roberts, the court addressed the issue of determining when fetuses are "patients" under the Act.' Statute of limitations issues also came before the court on a couple of occasions. In one particularly notable case, Chalifoux v. Radiology Associates of Richmond, the court expanded the continuing treatment rule by finding that even seemingly isolated instances of treatment may be part of a continuous course that tolls the statute of limitations. to causation in medical malpractice cases.
In Cashion v. Smith, the court addressed the qualified privilege that normally protects conversations between health care providers and explained defamation in the context of those conversa-tions." Looking ahead at anticipated developments, just prior to this publishing, the court in Temple v. Mary Washington Hospital, Inc. failed to reach the issue of the discoverability of hospital policies and procedures as well as metadata associated with medical records."
A. Medical Malpractice Act

Simpson v. Roberts
Simpson v. Roberts considered whether and when fetuses are considered "patients," as that term is defined by the Virginia Medical Malpractice Act (the "Act"). A "patient" is defined as "any natural person who receives or should have received health care from a licensed health care provider."" Whether an individual is a patient is important because, among other reasons, only treatment of patients is protected by the statutory damages cap.
In this case, Marissa Simpson brought a medical malpractice suit regarding permanent injuries she sustained in utero, allegedly because of a procedure performed on her mother before birth." After developing gestational diabetes, Simpson's mother was referred to Dr. Roberts, who performed an amniocentesis to determine if Simpson's lungs were mature enough to induce early labor." Dr. Roberts ceased his care following that procedure, and Simpson was delivered later that day with damaged kidneys and cerebral palsy." She alleged that these injuries were caused by negligent performance of the amniocentesis." After a $7 million jury verdict, the circuit court reduced her award to $1.4 million, pursuant to Virginia's medical malpractice cap. 
2013).
Simpson alleged that the Act's damages cap did not apply to her because at the time of injury, she had not yet been born and was therefore not yet a "patient" under the Act. 21 The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed. 22 The court instead solidified its prior rulings in Kalafut v. Gruver 2 3 and Bulala v. Boyd, which articulated the so-called "conditional liability rule." This doctrine states that " [a] tortfeasor who causes harm to an unborn child is subject to liability to the child, or to the child's estate, for the harm to the child, if the child is born alive."" Fetuses are considered to be a part of their mothers until birth, but at the time they are born alive (even if alive only momentarily), they obtain standing to bring suit not only for injuries subsequent to birth, but for those prior to delivery as well." Simpson attempted to distinguish her case by arguing that Dr. Roberts never intended to treat heronly her mother-and therefore she could not have been a patient. 27 Again, the supreme court disagreed, turning to principles of statutory interpretation to suggest that the Act intended to broadly cover all physicians providing treatment with the "security blanket" of the damages cap.
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The court's opinions in Bulala and Kalafut established that a fetus may bring a claim if born alive, and Simpson removes any doubt about the malpractice cap's applicability in those instances where an injury occurs in utero. But being born alive also makes the child a "patient" under the Act, which means that treating health care providers are protected by the Act, including the statutory damages cap, even though the child "patient" was not yet born when the alleged negligent act occurred. 
B. Statute of Limitations
Chalifoux v. Radiology Associates of Richmond
Chalifoux v. Radiology Associates of Richmond is a noteworthy case decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia because it seems to mark an expansion of the continuing treatment exception to the statute of limitations. That doctrine, an exception to the ordinary application of the statute of limitations in medical negligence cases, 0 delays the commencement of the two-year limitations period where there is a "continuous and substantially uninterrupted course of examination."' The application of the exception to specific factual circumstances has led to several noteworthy case decisions over the years.
3 2 Here, the court applied the continuing treatment exception to a radiology defendant that did not consider itself to have had a continuous and uninterrupted course of treatment with the referenced patient."
Chalifoux received radiology scans conducted by Radiology Associates of Richmond on six occasions over the course of approximately three years for intermittent head pain." Radiologists detected no abnormalities until the final examination, when one radiologist noted an anomaly that was, in retrospect, viewable on previous scans." The and suit was filed more than two years after the last allegedly negligent examination, it dismissed Chalifoux's case as being filed after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations."
The supreme court reversed and found that there was a continuous and uninterrupted course of treatment that tolled the commencement of the statute of limitations until the treatment course had concluded." The court reached its holding for three primary reasons: (1) each radiology examination related to the same or similar symptoms as previous studies; (2) there was evidence that Radiology Associates was aware of Chalifoux's ongoing symptoms because all the studies were kept in one file under Chalifoux's name; and (3) radiologists frequently review previous examinations, especially when they relate to the same symptoms." Chalifoux arguably expanded the common law understanding of what constitutes "continuous treatment" sufficient to prolong the commencement of the applicable statute of limitations.
McKinney v. Virginia Surgical Associates
McKinney v. Virginia Surgical Associates articulated the distinction between causes of action and rights of action in the context of a nonsuit. In McKinney, the plaintiff decedent filed a medical malpractice case, but died while the case was pending."o The widow of the plaintiff decedent, as administrator of decedent's estate, converted the pending personal injury action to one for wrongful death." She claimed that the death was a result of the defendant's negligence that was the subject of the case originally, but then nonsuited the wrongful death case following discovery." Within the nonsuit statute's six-month re-filing window, 43 but after the lapse of the initial two-year limitations period, McKinney filed a personal injury action based on the same alleged negli- gence as her nonsuited wrongful death action. 44 The defendant challenged the timeliness of the filing. 4 
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The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the cause of action in the case was the defendant's alleged medical malpractice, out of which arose two rights of action: (1) the decedent's right to bring a personal injury action, which survived to be carried on by his personal representative after his death; and (2) the personal representative's right to bring a wrongful death action.
4 ' The plaintiffs nonsuit in the wrongful death case applied to the cause of action as a whole, which, therefore, enabled her to re-file either of her rights of action within the six-month window after nonsuit." McKinney helps to clarify the distinction between cause of action and right of action.
C. Corporate
Lewis-Gale Medical Center v. Alldredge
Lewis-Gale Medical Center v. Alldredge addressed the rights of hospitals with regard to third party staffing agencies by clarifying the test for tortious interference in at-will employment contracts. Dr. Alldredge was an at-will employee of a physician staffing company which had an at-will employment contract with LewisGale Medical Center to staff its Emergency Department. 4 8 Dr. Alldredge was working at Lewis-Gale when relations soured between the two.
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Lewis-Gale expressed concern about Dr. Alldredge to the physician staffing company, which subsequently fired her to preserve its relationship with Lewis-Gale."o Dr. Alldredge then brought suit against Lewis-Gale for tortiously interfering in her employment contract with the staffing company.
In Virginia, proving tortious interference by a third party requires: (1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship; (2) third party knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship; and (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship was disrupted. 52 But when a contract is terminable at will, a plaintiff must additionally prove that the defendant employed "improper methods" in its interference, which usually means illegal or independently tortious activity. 8 In Alldredge, the Supreme Court of Virginia explained that even when a third party intentionally interferes in a contract for its own interest, tort liability does not automatically result." The plaintiff must prove that the third party's actions were illegal or fell so far outside the bounds of normal business practice-"rough-and-tumble" as it may sometimes be-as to be improper. Lewis-Gale's efforts to remove what it viewed as a troublesome employee were not "improper" and, therefore; did not tortiously interfere with the contract that employee had with her staffing company employer.
5 6 Alldredge reinforces the burden of proof for tortious interference, and may lessen certain concerns for businesses contracting with outside staffing companies by protecting more direct involvement in personnel decisions. 6 ' The supreme court disagreed. 64 The court noted that although Virginia nonsuit and federal voluntary dismissal rights are procedurally similar, the exercise of each varies significantly, with the nonsuit right being much more expansive." It also insisted that "the term 'nonsuit' identifies a specific practice used in Virginia civil procedure" that is not related to the federal right of voluntary dismissal." With the statute of limitations extensions that are attendant to these provisions, this application of law could result in situations where multiple dismissals of different types serve to prolong litigation.
D. Pleading and Practice
1.
Weatherbee v. Virginia State Bar
The Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Weatherbee v. Virginia State Bar can be read as a caution regarding the perils of insufficient pre-suit investigation and the requirements of Rule When Mr. Weatherbee filed suit on behalf of his client and alleged that Dr. Vaughan committed medical malpractice, he did so without contacting Dr. Vaughan to ask whether the plaintiff had been his patient or requesting medical records." As it turned out, Dr. Vaughan never saw the plaintiff as a patient, and had no privileges at the hospital at the time the plaintiff was treated.o While Weatherbee claimed to have deduced that Dr. Vaughan was involved based on some preliminary Board of Medicine website research, he made demonstrably false claims on the face of his complaint.
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The requirement of adequate pre-suit investigation to avoid frivolous filing is not new, but this case sheds fresh light on what exactly that requirement entails in the medical negligence context to avoid ethical violations. the signature of local counsel, as required by Rule 1A:4(2)." The circuit court then excluded the expert witnesses and entered summary judgment for defendants.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the circuit court's decision to sanction the plaintiff by excluding her experts was not an abuse of discretion." It also found that the plaintiffs failure to obtain local counsel's signature could not be amended because the lack of signature made the original supplemental designation an invalid instrument." The court also stated that prejudice to the opposing party is not a consideration in the Rule's enforcement.
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Landrum is not only a reminder of the importance of observing local rules when serving as pro hac vice counsel, but a warning to even Virginia lawyers that state courts are willing to enforce pretrial orders and that errors may not always be amendable. This message applies to all practice areas, but perhaps especially to the health law context where-as in Landrum-dismissal of a critical expert may result in summary judgment.
Landrum is noteworthy for another reason extending beyond the medical malpractice context. In arriving at its decision, the supreme court defined the abuse of discretion standard, often used during appellate review of a circuit court's decision.
7 ' The supreme court embraced the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's explanation for what constitutes an abuse of discretion:
An abuse of discretion ... can occur in three principal ways: when a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is not considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor is considered and given significant weight; and when all proper factors, and no improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing those factors, commits a clear error of judgment. The court has heartily adopted this rule as the standard bearer when reviewing cases for an abuse of discretion. In just under three years since the Landrum opinion, the above principle has been cited numerous times."o E. Expert Testimony
Hollingsworth v. Norfolk Southern Railway
In Hollingsworth v. Norfolk Southern Railway, the Supreme Court of Virginia declined to make an exception for podiatrists to the general rule that only medical doctors may testify to the cause of a human physical injury." This general rule stemmed from the Virginia Code's edict that only medical doctors were qualified to diagnose, and the supreme court's finding in Combs v. Norfolk & Western Railway that the ability to diagnose is a required element of determining the causation of human injury." The court has made exceptions in rare instances where nonphysical injuries were at issue. For example, licensed clinical social workers, though not medical doctors, may testify to the cause of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
Hollingsworth is significant for denying this kind of an exception to podiatrists. Hollingsworth sued his employer for foot injuries allegedly sustained during the course of his employment. 84 He designated two podiatrists to testify not only to the treatment that followed the injury, but to what caused the injury as well. In finding that the podiatrists were not qualified to testify as to causation, the supreme court returned to the emphasis on the ability to diagnose discussed in Combs." The scope of practice of podiatry under the Virginia Code-unlike that of the practice of medicine-included only the ability to treat, not diagnose, and be- cause the injuries at issue were physical, the other limited exceptions did not apply."
The general landscape remained unchanged after Hollingsworth," but the case makes a meaningful distinction between physical and non-physical human injuries. This distinction explains with greater clarity why only medical doctors are permitted to testify to causation in most cases. By drawing this distinction, the case also considerably limits the possibility of further exceptions to the general rule. it with better resuscitation." 'This was a very poor effort." "You didn't really try." "You gave up on him." "You determined from the beginning that he wasn't going to make it and purposefully didn't resuscitate him.").
91. Id. at 332, 749 S.E.2d at 529.
statements capable of being proven true or false, and which were non-defamatory statements that were mere opinion." It found that statements like "[t]his was a very poor effort" and "[y]ou didn't really try" were subjective and viewpoint-dependent, whereas statements like "[the patient] could have made it with better resuscitation" and "[y]ou determined from the beginning that he wasn't going to make it and purposefully didn't resuscitate him" were capable of being proven true or false, and thus possibly defamatory." Although "rhetorical hyperbole" is not defamatory under Virginia law, the court found that in the context in which it was said, the "euthanasia" statement could be understood as an actual, demonstrably true or false allegation."
Statements between health care providers concerning patient care are generally entitled to a qualified privilege because they are "communications between persons on a subject in which the persons have an interest or duty," but that privilege can be lost if statements are made with malice." Malice, however, is a question of fact for the jury, and may be established based on any one of five factors articulated in previous cases." When conversations get heated among health care providers, they should be wary of the possibility that they are subjecting themselves to defamation liability and potentially losing their qualified privilege. Cashion articulates the analysis that applies to different types of statements. Just prior to this publication, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided this case. Due to the resolution of a threshold procedural issue, the court did not reach a substantive question of wide interest: whether hospital policies and procedures and medical record metadata are discoverable after the General Assembly's 2011 amendments to Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17." In a previous lawsuit on the same cause of action, the circuit court denied Ms. Temple's motion to compel production of both hospital policies and medical record metadata, after which she nonsuited and then re-filed her case."
Hospital policies and procedures have long been the subject of discovery disputes in medical malpractice litigation, with some circuit courts finding them to be discoverable and others holding them to be privileged or otherwise beyond the scope of permissible discovery. there were merely part of the facts of the case or privileged recommendations of a hospital committee focused on quality assurance. It therefore falls to a future supreme court to decide this issue and consider whether the discoverability of medical records includes electronic metadata, such as user access records. pansion."' On May 1, 2014, The Washington Post reported that Governor McAuliffe was considering expanding health care coverage for the poor without the General Assembly's approval."' Whether this strategy affects passage of the state budget is a question separate from whether the state government remains fractured and contentious among party lines. Like it has been before, health care remains a focus in the Commonwealth."' Summaries of those enactments from 2012, 2013, and 2014, are likely to be of particular interest to health law practitioners and are included below.
See also
A. 2012 Session
Mammograms and Breast Density
In 2012, the General Assembly required the Board of Health to establish guidelines requiring licensed facilities providing mammography services to include information on breast density in mammogram letters sent to patients."' Additionally, in letters sent to patients having dense breast tissue, facilities and doctors must include a notice containing information about potential effects of dense breast tissue on mammograms."' Virginia became the third state in the country to enact such a law."' According to the Virginia Hospital Center, dense breasts "do not necessarily place a woman in a high-risk category" for cancer, and the law's stipulation regarding information sharing appears designed to 110. Dutton & St. George, supra note 109. 
Laura Vozzella, McAuliffe Explores Whether He Can Expand Medicaid Coverage
Who May Perform Surgery
The 2012 General Assembly added Virginia Code section 54.1-2400.01:1, which is among the longest statutes in the Virginia Code in terms of numerals, to define "surgery" to mean the "structural alteration of the human body by the incision or cutting into of tissue for the purpose of diagnostic or therapeutic treatment of conditions or disease processes by any instrument causing localized alteration or transposition of live human tissue... ."120 The statute further states that surgery does not include removal of superficial foreign bodies from the human body, The statute specifies who may perform surgery and requires that a person meet one of the following six criteria before they can structurally alter a patient: 
Id.
134. See, e.g., About Us, CHOOSEHOME, http://www.riversideonline.com/choosehome/ab out-us.cfm (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
permits the Commonwealth to more clearly delineate those organizations which provide CBCC care, and those that do not.
State Board of Health Guidelines for Cleanup of Drug Labs
"Meth Lab Explodes in Museum District," proclaimed the NBC News 12 headline on November 20, 2011, reporting a story seemingly straight out of the Breaking Bad television series."' Fiftyone-year-old Jeff Prillaman resided in a Grove Avenue apartment in Richmond, and was badly burned as a result of an explosion and fire caused by his attempts to produce methamphetamine.1 6 Prillaman entered a plea deal and received two and a half years in jail.m' During its 2012 session, the General Assembly added section 32.1-11.7 to the Virginia Code to require the State Board of Health to establish guidelines for the cleanup "of residential property formerly used as a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory.""' These guidelines outline health concerns related to the manufacture of methamphetamine, detail its contaminants, and describe procedures for cleanup and disposal of harmful chemicals created by the manufacturing process."'
Hospital Discharge Procedures
The provision of health care services to patients does not necessarily begin and end while at a health care facility. While physicians and care providers regularly made efforts to ensure that patients had proper information about signs and symptoms of future illness, for example, the Virginia legislature had never codified such a requirement until 2012. The 2012 General Assembly 
Meth Lab Explodes in Museum District
See Meth Lab Explodes in Museum District
Criminal History Information
The State Board of Health requires that a prospective volunteer or employee of an emergency medical services agency provide fingerprints and certain personal information so that the individual's materials can be run against a state and national criminal history record check.
14 ' Historically, the Virginia Office of the Emergency Medical Services had difficulties obtaining the necessary equipment for the implementation of Federal Bureau of Investigation background checks.' 42 This delay persisted through fall 2013.143
Eating Disorders
In an effort to raise awareness regarding eating disorders, the General Assembly enacted Virginia Code section 22.1-273.2, which requires each school board to provide parents of schoolchildren in grades five through twelve with educational information on eating disorders. 144 Scholarship concerning the effect of eating disorders on young individuals has grown in the past decade and a half. For instance, in a 1999 study of eleven-to sixteen-year-old African-American and Caucasian girls, researchers found significant inverse associations between increased parental education and various factors of harmful disorder outlooks, such as "drive for thinness." 145 In other words, the better parents were educated, the less likely it was that their daughters would drive to achieve a waifish figure. It therefore seems reasonable to think that increased parental education could improve future health outcomes in children and young adults.
Zoning and Temporary Health Care Structures
While health law and zoning law do not often intersect, Virginia Code section 15.2-2292.1 provides that a married couple may reside in a "temporary family health care structure."1 4 6 As The Washington Post described it, a temporary family health care structure is "an apartment equipped like a hospital room that can be set up in your backyard.""' The newspaper calls these units "granny pods" that "have arrived on the market as the nation prepares for a wave of graying baby boomers to retire."1' The consequence of the amendment, among others, is that the law now permits two individuals-rather than a "person"-to live in a temporary family health care structure when one individual is mentally or physically impaired, "and the other requires assistance with one or more activities of daily living. . . .
Medical Malpractice-Expert Witness Certification
In 2013, the General Assembly revised Virginia Code section 8.01-20.1 to permit a circuit court to conduct an in camera review of the certifying expert opinion obtained by the plaintiff. , http://www.washingtonpost.com/localldc-politics/ pioneering-the-granny-pod-fairfax-county-family-adapts-to-high-tech-dwelling-that-couldchange-elder-care/2012/11/25/4d9ccb44-lel8-11e2-ba31-3083ca97c314 story.html (describing the dwelling as "essentially a portable hospital room").
148. Kunkle, supra note 147. The General Assembly's 2013 addition of Virginia Code section 54.1-2408.3 addressed an apparent loophole in the ability of health practitioners to continue practicing even when their license is suspended. This statute now explicitly prohibits a practitioner or entity whose license is suspended or revoked by a health regulatory board of the Virginia Department of Health Professions from practicing in Virginia, pending appeal of the particular board's order."'
Emergency Medical Services and Policy Development
The General Assembly directed the Board of Health to charge the State Emergency Medical Services Advisory Board ("SEMSAB") with developing and implementing certain policies related to statewide emergency medical services.'" These include notifying an emergency medical services provider of the appeals process when he has received an adverse decision on his ability to provide those services in the future.xco SEMSAB must also implement standard operating procedures for the purposes of developing protocols for basic life support services provided by emergency medical personnel.1 6 ' Finally, the statute also attempts to make training materials and education more homogenous by requiring the Board of Health to review educational initiatives in cooperation with the SEMSAB. Notwithstanding, the integrity of firewall protections, while an admirable goal, may be elusive in practice for a resident and his or her family members due to the sophistication of electronic security issues in present-day society.
C. 2014 Session
Disposition of Dead Bodies
Virginia Code section 32.1-309.2 provides that where the next of kin of a deceased individual fails or refuses to claim the deceased person's body within ten days, the locality's attorney must request an order authorizing the person or institution having initial custody of the body to transfer custody of the body to a funer- The statute now limits employers to pecuniary liability of no more than twenty percent of reimbursement for nurse practitioners or physician assistants serving as assistants-at-surgery during a medical procedure on an eligible injured employee."' 7 This statute also limits to fifty percent the amount an employer must pay to an assistant surgeon in the same specialty as a primary surgeon during an el-* * p180 igible employee's surgery.
Surgical Technologists and Assistants
For three years, Senator George L. Barker attempted to pass a bill concerning when individuals could use the title "registered surgical technologist" or "registered surgical assistant.""' He eventually succeeded in 2014. 182 The law provides that a person cannot use the above titles unless registered with the Board of Medicine.'"' In turn, the Board must register those health professionals who have credentials from the National Board of Surgical Technology and Surgical Assisting, have successfully completed a technologist or assistant (respectively) training program as part of that person's service with the armed forces of the United States, or have practiced as a technologist or assistant at any time in the six months prior to July 1, 2014, provided that individual registers with the Board by July 1, 2015.184
Active Duty Military Health Care Providers
On the topic of the armed forces, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 54.1-2901 to clarify that active duty military health care providers offering health services at a public or private health care facility under official military orders are exempt from the state's licensure requirements."'
Civil Immunity for Certain Health Care Providers
In the 2014 session, the General Assembly extended protection from civil liability to members of and consultants to two types of health-related boards and committees."' The first is one established under a national accrediting organization granted authority by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to assure compliance with Medicare, and the second is one approved by state or local associations representing licensed health care providers."' Importantly, civil immunity extends only to acts or omissions performed as part of a member or consultant's duties on these committees. plan, and disability" of a patient in a medical malpractice case.' 8 9
The amendment also provides that physician assistants cannot testify as experts against physicians in medical malpractice actions with respect to standard of care and causation issues.'
Physician Assistants as Health Care Providers
If physician assistants can serve as expert witnesses on matters of diagnosis and treatment of a patient, then they should also be defined as "health care providers" for purposes of medical malpractice. Effective July 1, 2014, Delegate John M. O'Bannon, III's legislation does just that.' 9 ' As amended in section 8.01-581.1, physician assistants are now formally subject to medical malpractice laws in the Commonwealth of Virginia.' The General Assembly passed legislation allowing plaintiffs in a personal injury suit in general district court to offer evidence of their injury, treatment, and cost through reports created by outof-state health care providers.'" This legislation affords plaintiffs greater evidentiary latitude, to be sure, but they must still proffer information from the health care provider-whether out-of-state or in-state-that he or she was treated by the health care provider and that the information and costs in the report are accurate. 4 change in the law prompted by prosecutors missing the statute of limitations as a result of record falsification discovered after a year? Unfortunately, a Lexis search at the time of this publishing revealed no recent cases citing section 18.2-260.1-the law criminalizing falsification of patient records.
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Tolling of Statute of Limitations after Nonsuit
In the same vein as Virginia Code section 19.2-8, the General Assembly amended section 8.01-380 to provide that a plaintiff may recommence his or her action within six months after suffering a voluntary nonsuit.
2 0 s This legislation is not so much a change in the current law as it is a convenient cross-reference for litigants seeking to determine the effect of a nonsuit on the statute of limitations when reading section 8.01-380. Previously, the law did not explicitly direct parties to section 8.01-229, the provision controlling application of the statute of limitations after a nonsuit. 204 Now, it does.
minors and their possession thereof.
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Concern over the health of minors is not limited to e-cigarettes, of course. The General Assembly also enacted Virginia Code sections 18.2-265.19 to 18.2-265.21, which prohibit the sale of dextromethorphan--or Robitussin and other similar cough suppressant products-to those under eighteen years old. 209 At $25, the civil penalty for violating the law is a relative slap on the wrist for pharmacies, employees, and minors drawing an allowance. 210 However, these two pieces of health-related legislation demonstrate the relative agility of the General Assembly to address emerging health issues that concern individuals other than the voting eligible population (and, for all but a handful of lawmakers who voted against the bills, afford those running for reelection with strong "protect the children" credentials).
CONCLUSION
With the Affordable Care Act remaining divisive and a recent legislative battle over potential Medicaid expansion, health care law remains at the forefront of our national and state-wide political debate. Going forward we can expect to see an active court addressing procedural and evidentiary issues in medical negligence litigation, and an active General Assembly making incremental changes in this complex area of law. 
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